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By Democratic Audit
The Brazilian experience shows that voters are more forgiving
of incompetence than they are of corruption
Corruption in the UK is perceived as being on the rise, with recent research showing that British citizens are
increasingly concerned about the relationship between private financial interests and politicians. But are voters
willing to forgive corrupt politicians if they are competent? New research which looks at the Brazilian case by
Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro and Matthew S. Winters shows that voters are merciless when it comes to forgiving
corrupt officials and politicians, and that their electoral success is usually a result of lower voter information. 
At the end of  June 2013, over one million people took to the streets in cit ies across Brazil.  Protests that
had begun in the city of  São Paulo in reaction to mass transit f are hikes had become a nationwide
movement and had taken on a number of  additional concerns, such as the overall cost of  living in Brazil,
substandard provision of  social services, police brutality, and corruption.  In a survey that we ran in July
2013, over half  of  our respondents described corruption as one of  the main reasons f or the protests, and
one in f ive said that it was the main reason (second only to the f are increases).
Corruption is big business in Brazil, costing the country between 1.4 and 2.3 percent of  its total GDP,
according to a 2010 study by FIESP, the Federation of  Industries of  São Paulo State. Corruption is alleged
to be one of  the reasons why stadium construction and other inf rastructure projects related to the 2014
World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics have lagged behind and experienced severe cost overruns. The
2005 Mensalão scandal – in which the ruling Worker ’s Party (PT) made payments to national legislators to
guarantee their votes – demonstrated that corruption af f ects the highest levels of  government in Brazil.
Persistent polit ical corruption in a democracy necessarily means that voters are choosing to put corrupt
polit icians in of f ice.  And despite the anti-corruption message of  the 2013 protests, a piece of  conventional
wisdom in Brazil f or many years has been that they willingly do so, opting to support corrupt polit icians
because those polit icians are otherwise perf orming well.  “Rouba, mas faz,” in Portuguese: “He robs, but he
gets things done.”
In ongoing research that we began in the summer of  2010, we set out to see whether Brazilian voters really
thought this way, being willing to trade-of f  some polit ical corruption in exchange f or good perf ormance in
other areas.  In f ocus group discussions, people would tell us that the attitude was widespread but that
they themselves did not condone it.  And while three-quarters of  our 2010 survey respondents thought that
it was somewhat or very common f or polit icians to take bribes, an even larger proportion said that they
themselves had never personally voted f or a corrupt polit ician.  Very f ew people were willing to admit to
personally accepting polit ical corruption.
Since people will of ten obscure their true f eelings when asked directly in a survey question, we also
included an experiment in our survey, the results of  which have been published in the journal Comparative
Politics. Each survey respondent heard about a mayor running f or reelection. We described the mayor either
as corrupt or not corrupt, and we also described the mayor as either having provided many public works to
his city or f ew public works.  We then asked our respondents whether or not they thought that someone
like them would vote to reelect the mayor.
If  a widespread “rouba, mas faz” att itude exists in Brazil, then our surveys should have revealed that many
people would be more likely to reelect a corrupt mayor when that mayor had provided many public goods. 
Instead we f ound that inf ormation about good perf ormance in the realm of  public goods provision only
slightly of f set the corruption inf ormation.
Whereas 78 percent of  respondents supported reelecting a mayor who was f ree f rom corruption charges
(regardless of  the level of  public goods provision), only 19 percent were willing to support a corrupt mayor
– a dif f erence of  58 percentage points!  Among clean mayors, good public works provision increased their
popularity among our respondents by 26 percentage points, whereas good public works provision
redeemed corrupt mayors to a lesser extent: their reelection chances increased by only 15 percentage
points.  Voters react suf f iciently strongly to corruption that our clean but incompetent mayor was
supported by 62 percent of  the respondents who heard about him, while our corrupt but competent mayor
garnered support f rom only 28 percent of  those surveyed.
This willingness to withdraw support f rom corrupt polit icians suggests to us that corrupt polit icians get
elected in Brazil not because voters are willing to trade-of f  corruption f or perf ormance but rather because
they lack inf ormation about the corrupt behavior of  polit icians.  Our individual- level survey data theref ore
underpins a f inding by economists Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan.  In a 2008 article.  those authors
f ound that the revelation of  corruption in advance of  an election led to sharp reductions in re-election
rates f or mayors in comparison with equally-corrupt mayors where the corruption was revealed only af ter
the election and theref ore at too late a point in t ime f or voters to act on the inf ormation.  Since working
harder to reveal corruption is something more easily done than convincing people to change the way that
they view corruption, this is a posit ive result f rom the perspective of  combatting polit ical corruption in
Brazil.
For this reason, we are optimistic about anti-corruption campaigns in Brazil. The f ederal government audits
of  municipalit ies that are studied by Ferraz and Finan have been one way in which local- level corruption has
been revealed. And new survey work that we conducted in May 2013 demonstrates that cit izens believe
these f ederal audits to be a credible source of  inf ormation.
Beyond electoral decisions by voters, in reaction to the protests, the Brazilian senate f inally passed – af ter
a three-year delay – a law increasing the penalties f or corruption. The country’s Supreme Court also upheld
convictions of  those implicated in the Mensalão scandal. These types of  anti-corruption ef f orts in the law
and justice sector are equally important to the voting behaviour that we study.  And the f act that the new
law and the Supreme Court ruling come in the wake of  the protests might suggest that unconventional
polit ical participation can help bring about the anti-corruption init iatives that are necessarily in the hands of
the government and not voters.
If  our survey of f ers one point of  caution, however, it was a f inding with regard to our upper-class
respondents.  Surprisingly – and again in contrast to conventional wisdom – insof ar as we f ound a group
of  people willing to condone corruption when a polit ician was otherwise perf orming well, it  was among the
upper class.  Whereas clean if  incompetent mayors were pref erred by 34 percentage points to corrupt but
competent mayors among our overall sample, among our upper class respondents, the advantage was only
six percentage points, which was not statistically distinguishable f rom zero.
Given that members of  the upper class have more inf luence over the media and over government decision
making in t imes of  normal polit ics, this evidence f or a “rouba, mas faz” att itude among this group gives us
some cause f or concern.  Yet it is important to note that our sample of  upper-class respondents was f airly
small – 110 respondents out of  an overall sample of  2,002 Brazilians – which means that this result in
particular calls f or reexamination in f uture surveys.
—
Note: this post represents the views of the authors and not those of Democratic Audit or the LSE. Please read
our comments policy before posting. The shortened URL for this post is: http://buff.ly/1eZxYLZ
—
Matthew S. Winters is an Assistant Prof essor in the Department of  Polit ical Science at the University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro is an Assistant Prof essor of  Polit ical Science at Brown University.
 
